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FORMALIZATION OF THE AD HOMINEM ARGUMENTATION SCHEME 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, several examples from the literature, and one central new one, are used as case studies of 
texts of discourse containing an argumentation scheme that has now been widely investigated in literature 
on argumentation. Argumentation schemes represent common patterns of reasoning used in everyday 
conversational discourse. The most typical ones represent defeasible arguments based on nonmonotonic 
reasoning. Each scheme has a matching set of critical questions used to evaluate a particular argument 
fitting that scheme. The project is to study how to build a formal computational model of this scheme for 
the circumstantial ad hominem argument using argumentation tools and systems developed in artificial 
intelligence. It is shown how the formalization built using these tools is applicable to the tasks of 
identification, analysis and evaluation of the central case studied. One important implication of the work is 
that it provides a foundational basis for showing how other argumentation schemes can be formalized. 
 
     The development of new computer technologies based on formal models of 
argumentation schemes is an exciting prospect for those of us working in the fields where 
we need to identify analyze and evaluate common arguments of the kind often used in 
conversational discourse (Reed and Norman, 2003). By taking a particular example of a 
text of discourse containing an argument of a kind fitting the form of one of the 
traditional fallacies, this paper investigates how useful such formalizations are, at their 
present state of development. The type of argument chosen as the focus of the 
investigation is the circumstantial ad hominem argument, an argumentation scheme that 
has now been widely investigated in the literature on argumentation (Walton, 1998; 
Verheij, 2003; Walton, 2006). It will be shown that the formalizations studied in the 
paper are applicable and most useful for the tasks of identification and analysis of the 
example argument chosen as the case to be studied. However, it will also be shown that 
the formalizations provide useful tools that are helpful for the project of evaluating the 
argument. Evaluating any actual ad hominem argument in a real case using an abstract 
formal model is tall order, but that is the task carried out.  
     First it is shown how to model the argumentation scheme for the circumstantial ad 
hominem argument, with its distinctive premises and conclusion, using either of two 
formalizations that have now been developed in artificial intelligence. The hardest 
problem is that of modeling the critical questions matching the scheme.1 It is shown how 
one system of formalization of defeasible argumentation called DefLog (Verheij, 1999, 
2001, 2003) can be applied to ad hominem arguments. It is also shown how another 
system called Carneades, designed to be integrated into the semantic web, has made 
considerable progress in not only formalizing the ad hominem scheme, but even 
incorporating in the model computational tools for showing how the critical questions 
should be used in an evaluation of any argument fitting the scheme (Gordon, 2005; 
Walton and Gordon, 2005). The limits around the edges of applying these formal models 
are also discussed, for, as is well known, natural language argumentation tends to resist 
any formalization into a precise format of the sort that can be recognized by artificial 
intelligence of the kind used by a computer (Gordon, 1995). Argumentation in natural 
language discourse contains value-laden language (Bench-Capon, 2003), implicit 
                                                 
1 The usual device for analyzing and evaluating arguments that fit an argumentation scheme is the set of 
appropriate critical questions matching the scheme (Hastings, 1963; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; 
Kienpointner, 1992; Grennan, 1997). 
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premises, innuendo, and other forms of speech that are vague, ambiguous, and difficult to 
formulate as a set of propositions with precision and clarity (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1969; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004). The problem posed is not one of 
getting a perfect match between the formal model and the example. It is more a question 
of whether the formal model is useful as a tool to help us analyze and evaluate the 
argumentation in the given example, once we have reformulated the argument using tools 
of argumentation theory clearly enough so that it can be brought into line with some 
known argumentation scheme (Prakken and Sartor, 1996; 1997). Only by such means can 
we develop objective methods of evaluating ad hominem arguments in real cases by 
collecting, analyzing and using textual evidence to determine whether an ad hominem 
fallacy has been committed or not, judging from what is known (or nor known) in the 
case.  
 
1. Three Examples 
 
     In this section, three examples of the circumstantial ad hominem argument are 
presented. The first one is a summary of an article that appeared in the National Post 
(October 14, 2005, p. A10). It would be good for anyone reading this paper to read the 
whole article. It is only about one page, or one column in a newspaper format. Here, 
however, we will only present a brief summary of the main argument. 
 
The Sealers Example 
 
Rocco DiSpirito, a New York chef and best-selling food author, made famous as the star of the NBC reality 
show The Restaurant, wrote a public letter supporting a campaign by the U. S. Humane Society to end the 
Canadian seal hunt. The article quoted Mr. DiSpirito as saying, “Most of the seal clubbers [in Canada] are 
also snow crabbers. By refusing to use Canadian or Canadian-sourced snow crab in our restaurants, we can 
make a very vocal statement against the seal hunt.” The Humane Society had been lobbying for an 
American boycott of Canadian seafood, especially snow crab from Atlantic Canada, advocating the boycott as an 
economic tactic to stop the seal hunt. Many American restaurants and seafood wholesalers had joined the 
boycott, pledging not to buy Canadian seafood. Newfoundland fishermen in the sealing industry replied by 
arguing that DiSpirito was a hypocrite for calling the seal hunt inhumane while serving foie gras made from 
the engorged livers of force-fed geese in his restaurant. This practice was officially banned in some European 
countries and California, where the humane society condemned it. Frank Pinhorn, managing director of the 
Newfoundland-based Canadian Sealers Association, was quoted as saying, “He’s an absolute hypocrite, a 
man of double standards.” Earl McCurdy, president of the Fish, Food and Allied Workers Union in St. John’s 
was quoted as saying, “I think somebody who lives in a glass house shouldn’t throw stones. It shows the 
hypocrisy of these celebrities, who know nothing about the seal hunt ... if he wants to serve foie gras in his 
restaurants, that’s fine with me, but he shouldn’t pass judgment on us.” John Grandy, senior vice-president of 
the Humane Society, defended the chef. He was quoted as saying, “Absolutely the society is opposed to 
foie gras, but this issue is about seals, and a man of his distinction and abilities, who is simply appalled at 
the brutal destruction of these seals, well, if we can use him on the seals issue, we’re happy to do so.”  
 
There is much going on in this particular text of discourse involving many different kinds 
of arguments. The sealers’ argument is based on several argumentation schemes that have 
been widely studied in the literature. It is an instance of argument from a verbal 
classification, because it classifies certain actions or practices as inhumane. It is based on 
an implicit use of appeal to popular opinion, advocating the argument that since several 
states have banned the practice, that practice should be condemned. It is based on an 
argument from being in a position to know. The defenders of the sealers argue that New 
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Yorkers are not in a position to know about whether the practices of the sealers are 
humane or not, and the argument is arguably a straw man. The argument in the sealers 
example also fits the scheme of the type of ad hominem argument called guilt by 
association. The allegation is that snow crabbers are guilty by association with sealers. 
What the text of discourse says is that most of the seal clubbers are also snow crabbers. 
This statement implies that the association between the snow crabbers and the seal 
clubbers puts the snow crabbers in the same category as the seal clubbers, implying that 
they are guilty of these inhumane actions in the same way. The guilt by association 
argument in this case is at least questionable, and is well worth observing, but the central 
argument that is the unifying structure of the argumentation in the example as a whole is 
that of the circumstantial ad hominem argument.  
     Despite these other types of arguments being involved, we will focus on the central 
one in the example, that of the circumstantial ad hominem attack. Central to the case is 
the main thrust of the sealers’ argument, which takes the form of a circumstantial ad 
hominem attack on what they take to be the position of the humane society, and the chef 
taken to share that position. The sealers argue that the chef is a hypocrite for condemning 
sealing as inhumane on the grounds that his personal activities include practices that 
should be considered equally inhumane. They allege that there is a practical 
inconsistency between the argument that the chef advocates and his own personal 
practice of using products like fattened goose liver in his restaurant. Although the chef 
alleged that the practices of the Canadians sealers can be described using the negative 
term ‘inhumane’, the sealers reply by arguing that his own personal practices merit the 
same description. 
     The sealers example needs to be compared to two other standard examples of the 
circumstantial ad hominem argument that have already been treated in the literature. One 
of these cases is the smoking example (Walton, 1998 p. 7). 
 
The Smoking Example  
 
A parent argues to her child that smoking is associated with chronic disorders and that smoking is 
unhealthy, therefore the child should not smoke.  The child replies “You smoke yourself.  So much for your 
argument against smoking!” 
 
In this case, the child observes the action of the parent, and compares his observation of 
the parent’s action of smoking against her argument for not smoking. The parent 
advocates the policy of not smoking, but as the child observes, she herself smokes.  It is a 
classic case of arguing against somebody’s argument using the counter-argument that the 
original arguer does not practice what she preaches. In this case, it appears that the child 
commits a circumstantial ad hominem fallacy, because it appears that the child absolutely 
rejects the parent’s argument as worthless. However, the argument that the parent gives 
against smoking could be a good one. For example, the parent might show evidence of 
diseased lungs full of chronic obstructive lung disease caused by smoking. If the child is 
absolutely rejecting the parent’s argument that smoking is unhealthy, he could be 
committing a fallacy of jumping too quickly to the conclusion that the parent’s argument 
is worthless. On the other hand, if the child is merely questioning the sincerity of the 
parent’s argument by pointing out a pragmatic inconsistency between her words and 
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actions, expressing doubt about the argument by questioning the parent’s credibility, the 
child would appear to have a good point.  
     The additional point can be made (Walton 1998, p. 31) that the parent could reply to 
the child’s allegation of practical inconsistency by stating that she has tried very hard to 
give up smoking, but that nicotine is addictive. She might counsel the child not to start 
smoking because it is an addictive habit and because it is unhealthy. In such a case, the 
parent has explained her way out of the practical inconsistency used by the child to attack 
her advice. Even though she admits that she smokes, she argues that her action of 
smoking should not be held against her advice on what the child should do. In this case 
then, whether or not the child commits a circumstantial ad hominem fallacy depends on 
how the child is taking the conclusion of his own argument against the parent’s argument. 
If the child is absolutely rejecting the parents argument as worthless, that would be 
committing an ad hominem fallacy, whereas if the child is only raising critical questions 
about the parent’s argument, based on his observations of the pragmatic inconsistency, 
his ad hominem argument could be reasonable.   
     The sealers example also needs to be compared with another standard example that it 
is similar to in other respects. In this case (Walton 1998 p. 32), a critic attacks a hunter 
for killing animals for sport, whereupon the hunter attacks back by questioning the 
personal circumstances of the critic.   
 
The Hunter Example  
 
A hunter is accused of barbarity for his sacrifice of innocent animals to his own amusement or sport 
hunting.  His reply to his critic: “why do you feed on the flesh of harmless cattle?”  
 
The problem posed by the hunter example is similar to the one in the smoking example. 
The hunter accuses the critic of a circumstantial inconsistency and uses this accusation to 
suggest that the critic is not really a sincere advocate of his own argument. By throwing 
doubt on the sincerity of the critic, the hunter shifts a burden of proof to the critic’s side, 
implying that the critic is a hypocrite, or at any rate is not a sincere person who should be 
thought to have much credibility in the debate. 
     The difference between the hunter example and smoker example is that, in the latter 
case, a direct inconsistency is involved. The parent argues for a policy of not smoking, 
but admits that she personally smokes. In this case, the policy advocated is the opposite, 
or negation, of the description of the action that the parent is actually carrying out in her 
personal circumstances. The relationship between the two propositions in the hunter case 
is more indirect. It may be that the critic is not a vegetarian, and eats the occasional steak 
or pork chop. But is this personal circumstance enough to defeat the accusation of the 
hunter? It may be, because there is a connection (in the form of an implicit generalization 
that is a matter of common knowledge), between eating meat and hunting animals: killing 
animals is the necessary means for obtaining meat used for human consumption. Thus the 
hunter has some support of logic on his side. On the other hand, we have to be very 
careful in evaluating the argument in this case. The critic is presumably not herself a 
hunter, and she is criticizing the hunter for engaging in the sacrifice of animals for his 
own amusement or sport. She classifies this activity using the word ‘barbarity’. Thus the 
critic is not being inconsistent in the way the hunter argument may appear to suggest. De 
Morgan (1847, 65) put this point very well in commenting on the parallel between the 
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situation of the hunter and the critic: “the parallel will not exist until, for the person who 
eats meat, we substitute one who turns butcher for amusement.” 
 
2. Ad Hominem Argumentation Schemes  
 
     The most basic form of the ad hominem is the direct or personal type. The scheme for 
the direct ad hominem argument is given in Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation 
(Walton, 2006, p. 123) as follows. 
 
Argumentation Scheme for the Direct Ad Hominem Argument 
 
Character Attack Premise: a is a person of bad character. 
 
Conclusion: a’s argument should not be accepted. 
 
In this scheme, a stands for an agent that is proponent of an argument that has been 
previously put forward. The ad hominem argument then brought forward attacks this 
prior argument by arguing that a is a person of bad character. For example, the attacker 
may say that a has often lied in the past. What is the basis of such an attack? The basis is 
that, in many cases of argumentation, a person’s argument depends on his presumed 
honesty, ethical character, and trustworthiness. For example in a case of witness 
testimony, it is an important underlying assumption that the witness can be counted on to 
tell the truth. Thus an ad hominem argument is most effective when it raises doubts about 
an arguer’s credibility, so that his argument is discounted. This type of argument is 
typically called the abusive ad hominem argument in logic textbooks. But this label is 
misleading because it suggests that direct ad hominem arguments are fallacious. In fact, 
they are often reasonable, as in a case where the credibility of a witness is attacked during 
cross-examination in court (Walton, 1998).   
     The following three critical questions are offered (Walton, 2006, p. 123) as 
appropriate for raising doubts about the direct ad hominem argument.  
 
1. How well supported by evidence is the allegation made in the character attack 
premise? 
2. Is the issue of character relevant in the type of dialogue in which the argument was 
used? 
3. Is the conclusion of the argument that A should be (absolutely) rejected, even if other 
evidence to support A has been presented, or is the conclusion merely (the relative claim) 
that a should be assigned a reduced weight of credibility as a supporter of A, relative to 
the total body of evidence available? 
 
The scheme, along with the critical questions, is meant to be used by a critic to evaluate 
any given instance of a direct ad hominem argument found in a text of discourse. First, 
the critic has to verify that the argument in question fits the scheme, and thus is a genuine 
instance of the direct ad hominem type of argument. Then the critic can raise doubts 
about whether the argument holds by asking any one of the critical questions matching 
the scheme. The evaluation is a dialog process. If one of the questions matching the 
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scheme cannot be answered, revealing a critical gap in the argument by pinpointing a 
required assumption that is not justified, the original argument defaults (Verheij, 2005).   
     The circumstantial ad hominem argument combines the scheme for the direct ad 
hominem argument with the scheme for argument from inconsistent commitment 
(Walton, 2006, p. 123). In Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation (2006, p. 125), the 
following argumentation scheme for the circumstantial ad hominem argument is given. 
The inconsistent commitment premise represents argument from inconsistent 
commitment as one component. By questioning the arguer’s character as a sincere person 
who can be trusted, the credibility questioning premise represents the direct ad hominem 
argument as a component. It is important here to distinguish between an argument from 
inconsistent commitment that is not an ad hominem argument and one that is. Only the 
latter should properly be classified as an ad hominem argument, according to the analysis 
defended at some length in (Walton, 1998).  
 
Argumentation Scheme for the Circumstantial Ad Hominem Argument (Walton, 2006, p. 
125) 
 
Argument Premise: a advocates argument α, which has proposition A as its conclusion. 
 
Inconsistent Commitment Premise: a is personally committed to the opposite (negation) 
of A, as shown by commitments expressed in her/his personal actions or personal 
circumstances expressing such commitments. 
 
Credibility Questioning Premise: a’s credibility as a sincere person who believes in his 
own argument has been put into question (by the two premises above). 
 
Conclusion: The plausibility a’s argument α is decreased or destroyed. 
 
The following four critical questions are cited (p. 126) as appropriate for the 
circumstantial ad hominem argument. 
 
1. Is there a pair of commitments that can be identified, as shown by evidence, to be 
commitments of a, and taken to show that a is practically inconsistent? 
2. Once the practical inconsistency is identified that is the focus of the attack, could it be 
resolved or explained by further dialogue, thus preserving the consistency of the arguer’s 
commitments in the dialogue, or showing that a’s inconsistent commitment does not 
support the claim that a lacks credibility? 
3. Is character an issue in the dialogue, and more specifically, does a’s argument depend 
on his/her credibility?  
4. Is the conclusion the weaker claim that a’s credibility is open to question or the 
stronger claim that the conclusion of α is false? 
 
One of the most important things to realize is that the circumstantial ad hominem 
argument, as defined by the scheme above, is not the same as an argument from 
inconsistent commitment. The latter, a species of argument from commitment has the 
following general form (Walton, 2006, p. 120). 
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Argumentation Scheme for Argument from Inconsistent Commitment 
 
Initial Commitment Premise: a has claimed or indicated that he is committed to 
proposition A (generally, or in virtue of what he said in the past). 
 
Opposed Commitment Premise: other evidence in this particular case shows that a is not 
really committed to A. 
 
Conclusion: a's commitments are inconsistent. 
 
Argument from inconsistent commitment is also a defeasible form of argument that can 
be cast into doubt by asking one or more of a list of matching critical questions. To 
resolve the issues raised by the use of an argument from inconsistent commitments, it has 
to be judged how well the questions can be answered. To do this, a critic will need to go 
further into the textual details of the given case and judge matters like whether the 
alleged inconsistency is apparent or can be proved to be real, based on the arguer’s 
commitments. Even if the arguer being attacked admits there really is an inconsistency of 
the alleged sort in his commitment set, he might still be able to explain how the conflict 
can be dealt with and resolved. 
     The important thing to recognize is that the difference between argument from 
inconsistent commitment and the circumstantial ad hominem argument is that the latter, 
but not the former, contains within it a direct ad hominem argument that is the basis of it. 
The problem is that throughout the long history of the subject (Walton, 1998, pp. 106-
111) ad hominem has often been characterized as identical to argument from inconsistent 
commitment. It was argued in (Walton, 1998) that this view should be rejected, because 
all ad hominem arguments as a class, including the circumstantial type, should be defined 
as personal attack arguments. In other words, the thesis is that all genuine ad hominem 
arguments should contain an attack on the arguer’s ethical character as an essential 
requirement. In the scheme for the circumstantial ad hominem argument above, that 
requirement is taken care of by the credibility questioning premise.  
 
3. Applying the Scheme to the Case 
 
     There are two sides to the case. Let’s call them the sealers group (S) and the humane 
society group, including the chef (C). We can attribute the following argument to C.  
 
Argument Alpha 
 
The seal hunt is inhumane.  
 
Therefore it should be stopped. 
 
We can help to stop it by boycotting Canadian seafood. 
 
Therefore, we should boycott Canadian seafood. 
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This argument is an instance of practical reasoning, the first part of itself being an 
argument. It is implied that the first argument rests on the reason (implicit premise) that 
inhumane treatment of animals should be stopped. This yields argument beta. 
 
Argument Beta 
 
The seal hunt is inhumane.  
 
Implicit Reason: Generally, inhumane treatment of animals should be stopped 
 
Therefore the seal hunt should be stopped. 
 
Argument alpha is a typical chain of argumentation in which the conclusion of one 
argument reappears as a premise in an adjoining argument. Argument beta is an 
enthymeme, an argument in which an implicit premise is needed to combine with an 
explicit premise in order to support the conclusion. The two arguments are combined, as 
shown in the argument diagram in figure 1 below, constructed by using the free software 
tool for argument diagramming called Araucaria (Reed and Rowe, 2005). It aids a user 
when constructing a diagram of the structure of an argument by inserting the text to be 
analyzed as a text document into Araucaria. Each statement is represented in a text box 
that appears on the screen. Next a user can then draw in arrows from each premise to 
each conclusion it supports, producing an argument diagram connecting all the premises 
and conclusions in one comprehensive diagram.  
 
Figure 1: Argument Diagram of Arguments Alpha and Beta 
                           
             
 
 
This argument diagram shows how the two premises displayed in the middle are linked 
together by an argumentation scheme called practical reasoning.  At the bottom level, a 
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linked argument is displayed in which one premise is shown in a darkened box with 
dotted lines around the edges. This argument is an enthymeme, in which the premise on 
the right is an implicit assumption, not explicitly stated in the text of discourse of the 
sealers example. This premise is combined with the other one, as shown in the diagram, 
based on the scheme for argument from a verbal classification. The rationale is that the 
premise on the left at the bottom classifies the seal hunt as something that is inhumane.   
     S attacks argument beta, and thereby argument alpha, by using the following 
circumstantial ad hominem argument. 
 
Circumstantial Ad Hominem Identified in the Sealers Example 
 
Argument Premise: C advocates the proposition P that inhumane treatment of animals 
should be stopped. 
 
Inconsistent Commitment Premise: C is personally committed to the opposite (negation) 
of P, as shown by commitments expressed in his personal actions or circumstances of 
serving foie gras made from the livers of force-fed geese (an inhumane practice, as C 
agrees). 
 
Credibility Questioning Premise: C’s credibility as a sincere person who believes in his 
own argument has been put into question (by the two premises above). 
 
Conclusion: The plausibility of C’s argument beta is decreased or destroyed. 
 
The structure of this argument can be represented on an Araucaria diagram in a way that 
is highly revealing. The screen shot in figure 2 below shows how the circumstantial ad 
hominem is selected form the list of schemes called “Walton”. 
 
Figure 2: Screen Shot of the Selection of the Scheme in Araucaria 
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In figure 2 it is shown how the scheme is called circumstantial argument against the 
person (circumstantial ad hominem) in the Walton scheme list. 
     Now it can be shown how the argument diagram produced by selecting this scheme 
looks in Araucaria. Figure 3 shows the structure of the circumstantial ad hominem 
argument in the sealers case below. It shows the premises and the conclusion of the 
argument, displays the argumentation scheme for the circumstantial ad hominem as 
applied to the argument, and shows how the scheme is fitted to the text of discourse of 
the sealers example, identifying the circumstantial ad hominem as a type of argument that 
can be shown to be present in the case.  
 
Figure 3: Araucaria Diagram of the Circumstantial Ad Hominem Argument in the Sealers 
Example 
 
                                     
The interesting thing about the diagram in figure 3 is that it shows something unexpected. 
You would normally expect all the premises of the circumstantial ad hominem to go 
together as a linked argument supporting the conclusion. What the diagram reveals is that 
the two premises at the bottom go together in a linked argument configuration that 
supports the premise represented in the box in the middle of the diagram. What the 
diagram tells us is that the pragmatic inconsistency displayed in the bottom two premises 
functions as a reason for attacking the arguer’s credibility, as displayed in the middle box. 
What is shown is that the top step in the argument shown in figure 3 can itself be 
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regarded as a direct ad hominem argument. The diagram reveals how the circumstantial 
ad hominem argument is connected to the direct ad hominem argument. It shows how the 
circumstantial ad hominem argument is a specials subspecies of the direct ad hominem 
argument that attacks the arguer’s character for sincerity based on a perceived practical 
inconsistency in that person’s argumentation and circumstances. 
 
4. Verheij’s Formalization 
 
     Verheij (2003) proposed a method for formalizing argumentation schemes, and used 
the schemes for argumentum ad hominem (Walton, 1998) as his primary body of material 
for illustrating how the proposed method will work. Verheij’s system (p. 170) attempts to 
show how pragmatic argumentation schemes can be systematically analyzed using formal 
methods. His method is based on the key observation that there is a structural 
resemblance between logical rules of inference like modus ponens and pragmatic 
argumentation schemes like those for the ad hominem argument. Based on this 
resemblance, his method is to treat argumentation schemes as inferences having a 
premise-conclusion form (p. 170). He postulates his analysis (p. 176) on the assumption 
that any argumentation scheme is taken to have the following general form. 
 
Premise 1. Premise 2. . . . Premise n. Therefore Conclusion. 
 
Verheij (p. 177) uses an argument diagramming method called ArguMed to represent 
argumentation schemes and show how they apply to arguments in a given case. How the 
basic structure of any scheme is represented in ArguMed is shown by the argument 
diagram in figure 4, redrawn from the diagram in (Verheij, 2003, p.177). 
 
 Figure 4: Diagram of the Structure of an Argumentation Scheme in ArguMed  
This argument structure can fit any of the argumentation schemes, including, as will be 
Conclusion 
Premise 1
Premise 2
Premise n
. . .
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shown below, the various types of schemes for ad hominem argumentation modeled in 
(Walton, 1998).  
     Verheij (2003 p. 177) offered a graphical representation of the argumentation scheme 
for the direct type of ad hominem argument found in (Walton 1998), similar to the one 
drawn in figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5: ArguMed Diagram for the Direct Ad Hominem Argument 
 
Another illustration can be given to show how Verheij represents a more complex type of 
ad hominem argument in his system of argument diagramming. He offers (Verheij, 2003, 
p. 178) a different graphical representation of the argumentation scheme for the guilt by 
association type of ad hominem argument found in (Walton 1998). It should be noted that 
these are two distinct argumentation schemes representing two different types of ad 
hominem arguments. The guilt by association type of ad hominem argument incorporates 
the direct type of ad hominem argument as an essential part.  
     Extrapolating from Verheij’s presentation of these two types of ad hominem 
arguments in his system of argument diagramming, we can show how he might represent 
the circumstantial type of ad hominem argument of the kind represented by the scheme 
from (Walton, 2006) presented above. 
 
Figure 6: ArguMed Diagram for the Circumstantial Ad Hominem Argument 
 
The plausibility of a’s argument α is decreased or destroyed 
a’s credibility as a sincere person who believes in his own argument has 
been put into question (by the two premises above) 
a is personally committed to the opposite (negation) of A, as shown by 
commitments expressed in her/his personal actions or personal 
circumstances expressing such commitments 
a’s argument should not be accepted
a is a person of bad character
a advocates argument α, which has proposition A as its conclusion 
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A clear difference between this argument diagram and the previous Araucaria diagram 
representing the circumstantial ad hominem argument in figure 3 is that the Araucaria 
diagram explicitly represented the distinction between linked and convergent arguments. 
The argument in the sealers case in figure 3 showed how the circumstantial argument 
against the chef is a linked argument in which two of the premises are bound together in 
the argumentation scheme for the circumstantial ad hominem argument, and then 
combined with the remaining premise.2  
          Verheij sees pragmatic argumentation schemes as being inherently defeasible. In a 
typical pragmatic argumentation scheme, the premises do not justify the conclusion 
exclusively on the basis of the premises. Schemes are subject to exceptions. Thus one of 
the important steps in the methodology of his investigation of formalizing argumentation 
schemes is to determine the exceptions blocking the use of a given argumentation scheme 
(p. 174). On his approach it is important not only to determine the types of premises 
characteristic of an argumentation scheme, and to analyze the logical structure of the 
scheme as an inference, but also to determine what kinds of exceptions might make an 
argument fitting an argumentation scheme default.  In ArguMed, blocking moves that 
make an argument default are drawn by a device called entanglement. Entanglement is 
represented as a line that meets another line at a junction marked by an X, indicating that 
new evidence attacks the inferential link between the premises and conclusion of the 
original argument, making the original argument default.  
     The idea of entanglement is that the connection between a reason and its conclusion, 
represented by the arrow between them, can be the subject of argumentation, just like 
other claims. Such argumentation can be either supporting, by giving reasons for the 
connection between the reason and its conclusion, or attacking, by giving reasons against 
the connection between the reason and its conclusion. The positive version of 
entanglement is represented graphically by an ordinary arrow pointing to another arrow. 
The negative version of entanglement is represented graphically by an arrow ending in a 
cross (X) pointing to another arrow. 
     The argument diagram in figure 7 illustrates how new evidence of this kind can make 
an instance of the circumstantial ad hominem argument default. It illustrates the negative 
version of entanglement. 
 
Figure 7: Default of a Circumstantial Ad Hominem Argument in ArguMed 
 
                                                 
2 Note also that ArguMed version shown in figure 6 is a single step graphical representation of the 
argumentation scheme presented for the circumstantial ad hominem argument, whereas the graphical 
representation shown in figure 3, the Araucaria version, is a different analysis. The latter version has two 
premises, one intermediate conclusion and one final conclusion. The difference between the former and the 
latter versions is that in the latter, the intermediate conclusion is a premise is a next step in the argument. 
This difference suggests the hypothesis that the analysis shown in figure 3 may be better because it displays 
a dependency between the three premises in a way that is made explicit. However, this difference between 
the two versions does not imply a difference between Araucaria and ArguMed as visualization tools for 
analysis. In both it is possible to chain argument steps. 
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As shown in figure 7, the argument fits the form of the circumstantial ad hominem type 
of argument, as indicated by the conclusion and the three bottom premises, but the fourth 
premise, when added, makes the ad hominem argument default.  
     This last step takes us into the question of how the critical questions matching a given 
scheme should be used to raise doubts about the applicability of the scheme and make an 
argumentum ad hominem default. Can the critical questions be modeled as implicit 
premises that, when added to an argument, can either support it or make it default? This 
possibility is extremely exciting, from a point of view of formalizing argumentation 
schemes, because the job would be made much easier if we could represent the critical 
questions as propositions that function as additional premises of a given argument, thus 
relieving us of the problem of how to deal with the logical form of questions.  
 
5. Defeasible Generalizations and Argument Defeat 
 
     In this section it is shown that there are three kinds of generalizations that need to be 
distinguished: (1) the universal (absolute) generalization, (2) the inductive (statistical) 
generalization, and (3) the presumptive (defeasible) generalization. The statement ‘All 
birds fly’ can be interpreted as a universal generalization, if taken as a statement that is 
falsified by a single counter-example. Taking the predicate letter F to stand for the 
property of being a bird, and the predicate letter G to stand for the property of being 
something that flies, the universal generalization ‘All birds fly’ may be represented has 
the standard logical form (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx)  in classical deductive logic. As an example of a 
type of argument based on this kind of generalization, consider the following deductively 
valid inference. 
 
(∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx)  
The plausibility a’s argument α is decreased or destroyed 
a’s credibility as a sincere person who believes in his own argument has 
been put into question (by the two premises below) 
a is personally committed to the opposite (negation) of A, as shown by 
commitments expressed in her/his personal actions or personal 
circumstances expressing such commitments 
a shows that the practical inconsistency can be explained, preserving the 
consistency of his comments and restoring his credibility 
a advocates argument α, which has proposition A as its conclusion 
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Consider an inductive argument, in contrast, based on the inductive generalization ‘98.6 
per cent of birds fly’, with the additional premise that Tweety is a bird. These premises 
support the conclusion that Tweety flies by an inductively strong argument. It is logically 
possible for both premises to be true and the conclusion false, but it is improbable for 
both premises to be true while the conclusion is false. We are familiar with recognizing 
the distinction between deductively valid and inductively strong inferences. While some 
will argue about the details of how the distinction should be made, there is wide general 
acceptance that such a distinction is necessary and important. 
     The classic example of a third kind of generalization we might call the defeasible or 
presumptive type (terminology does not appear to be settled) is the statement ‘Birds fly’ 
taken to mean that birds generally fly, subject to exceptions that cannot all be anticipated 
in advance. This type of generalization says, ‘Given something is a bird, we expect it to 
fly, in a normal type of case, but in special circumstances, it might fail to fly’. In the 
special circumstances that Tweety is a penguin, or a bird with a broken wing, Tweety 
cannot fly, and in such a special case, the generalization is subject to an exception, 
making any argument based on it default. As Reiter (1987, p. 149) showed, this kind of 
argument is tenable in cases of uncertainty and absence of knowledge, and is based on a 
qualified generalization with a clause saying “absence of information to the contrary”. 
The argument works on a principle of a shifting burden of proof, implying that it holds 
tentatively during an investigation, as long as it has not been disproved, but it can fail if 
new evidence is collected that refutes it, as applied to a special case. If the proponent fails 
to give the evidence required to prove the claim, once it has been shown to default, he 
must retract the claim. But in this case, the claim is presumptive in nature. The defeasible 
generalization occupies a ground tentatively. As long there is nothing special about 
Tweety indicating that he cannot fly, the argument for the conclusion that Tweety can fly 
holds. But if an opponent cites new evidence that revealing special features of the case 
that present an exception to the generalization, it fails to hold, and must be given up.  
     Presumptive generalization is different from inductive reasoning of the Bayesian kind 
because it is based on what one can presume to be true in a normal type of case, based on 
what is known so far in an investigation, even though it is known that not everything is 
known yet. Special circumstances can make the generalization default in way that cannot 
be known or predicted in advance by probabilities (Rescher, 1976). What really matters is 
not statistical regularity, but whether the generalization is subject to exceptions of a kind 
that are not all known in advance at the stage the investigation has now reached (Prakken 
and Sartor, 2003). This pattern can be illustrated by expressing the classic Tweety 
argument in the following form. 
 
Given that Tweety is a bird, generally, but subject to qualifications in special 
circumstances, Tweety can fly. 
 
It can be established that Tweety is a bird. 
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So far, there are no special circumstances of the given case that would make the 
generalization in the first premise default. 
 
Therefore, as far as we know at this point in the investigation, Tweety can fly. 
 
This argument holds, as things stand, because generally it is true that birds fly. However, 
it can also fail in specific instances. In a case where it is discovered that Tweety is a 
penguin, the first two premises of the argument above hold as true but the third one fails, 
making the argument default.  
     Verheij (2001, p. 232) proposed the hypothesis that argumentation schemes can be 
modeled using defeasible generalizations (1999, p. 113) based on a distinction between 
two rule-based forms of inference. The first one is the familiar modus form of argument 
from classical deductive logic.  
 
Modus Ponens 
 
As a rule, if P then Q 
 
 P 
 
Therefore Q 
 
 
Modus Non Excipiens 
 
As a rule, if P then Q 
 
P 
 
It is not the case that there is an exception to the rule that if P then Q 
 
Therefore Q 
 
On his model,  (2000, p. 5), in an instance in which only strict rules are involved, modus 
ponens can be applied, but modus non excipiens needs to be applied in an instance where 
both strict rules and rules not admitting of exceptions might possibly come into play. For 
example if the given argument is based on a universal generalizations about all triangles, 
without exception modus ponens can be applied. But modus non excipiens always needs 
to be applied in a case where the generalization is subject to qualifications. Rather than 
using cumbersome Latin expressions like modus non excipiens, these two forms of 
argument might better be called strict modus ponens (SMP) and defeasible modus ponens 
(DMP). The terminology remains unsettled. Some would claim that DMP is not really a 
modus ponens type of argument, and should not even be called a modus ponens argument 
at all. Others are happy to use the label DMP, as long as the distinction between it and the 
deductive form SMP is made clear.  
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     It is already clear from the literature on argumentation schemes that some schemes 
have a DMP structure. The scheme for argument from commitment is a case in point. In 
the following representation of this scheme (Walton, 1995, p. 144), P is a participant in a 
discussion and A and B are propositions. 
 
Scheme for Argument from Commitment 
 
Generally, if P is committed to A than A is also committed to B. 
 
 P is committed to A. 
 
Therefore P is committed to B. 
 
Many of the common schemes studied in the literature are defeasible, and it is not very 
plausible that they are reducible to a deductive form or to some known inductive form 
like the statistical syllogism (Reed and Walton, 2005). 
     The first step in revising the scheme for the direct ad hominem to fit the requirements 
of a system of defeasible argumentation schemes is to add the generalization that 
functions as a warrant to license the inference from the other premise to the conclusion.  
 
Revised Argumentation Scheme for the Direct Ad Hominem Argument 
 
Character Attack Premise: a is a person of bad character. 
 
Generalization: given that a is a person of bad character, then generally, but subject to 
qualifications in special circumstances, a’s argument should not be accepted. 
 
Qualification: so far, there are no special circumstances of the given case that would 
make the generalization premise default. 
 
Conclusion: as far as we know at this point, a’s argument should not be accepted. 
  
Now we come to the critical questions. As pointed out by Verheij, the first critical 
question merely repeats the first premise. And as noted above, the second question is a 
matter of relevance. Assuming that both are redundant in a formalized treatment, the third 
critical question is the only one that needs to be considered.  
     The third critical question draws a distinction in how to interpret the conclusion. This 
question functions like a warning not to uncritically take the conclusion in a stronger 
way, when usually ad hominem argumentation is better taken in the weaker way.  
 
Revised Argumentation Scheme for the Circumstantial Ad Hominem Argument 
 
Argument Premise: a advocates argument α, which has proposition A as its conclusion. 
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Inconsistent Commitment Premise: a is personally committed to the opposite (negation) 
of A, as shown by commitments expressed in her/his personal actions or personal 
circumstances expressing such commitments. 
 
Credibility Questioning Premise: a’s credibility as a sincere person who believes in his 
own argument has been put into question (by the two premises above). 
 
Generalization: given that a advocates argument α, which has proposition A as its 
conclusion, and a is personally committed to the opposite (negation) of A, as shown by 
commitments expressed in her/his personal actions or personal circumstances expressing 
such commitments, and a’s credibility as a sincere person who believes in his own 
argument has been put into question, then generally, but subject to qualifications in 
special circumstances, the plausibility a’s argument α is decreased or destroyed. 
 
Qualification: so far, there are no special circumstances of the given case that would 
make the generalization premise default. 
 
Conclusion: as far as we know at this point, the plausibility a’s argument α is decreased 
or destroyed. 
 
But now, having revised the structure of the scheme for the circumstantial ad hominem 
argument, we have the problem of how such a scheme could be formalized.  
     This choice raises the problem of how such defeasible arguments are to be evaluated, 
which depends on the controversial notion of argument defeat. A first pass through the 
literature on argument defeat must begin with the distinction between undercutters and 
defeaters (Pollock, 1995, pp. 40-41) A defeater, sometime also called a rebuttal or 
refutation of an argument, is defined by Pollock as another argument that has the opposite 
(negation) of the original conclusion as its conclusion.3 A Pollockian undercutter is a 
counter-argument that attacks the inferential link between the premises and the 
conclusion in the original argument. The undercutter seems to be the weaker form of 
attack, one that only raises questions on whether the original argument supports it 
conclusion, leaving room for doubt. The defeater appears to be a stronger form of attack. 
  
6. Two Formal Systems: DefLog and Carneades 
 
     Another most difficult, central theoretical problem in current argumentation theory is 
the analysis of the concept of argument defeat. Argument defeat is obviously something 
different from classical negation, but exactly what it is has never been made clear. Two 
types of argument rebuttals called defeaters and undercutters have been recognized in the 
literature (Pollock, 1995), but the precise nature of the distinction, and how it is to be 
applied to legal argumentation, has proved to be a source of some uncertainty. 
     Verheij (2003a) developed a formal system of defeasible reasoning called DefLog 
that, as shown above, can be used to model the argumentation schemes for argumentum 
ad hominem, including both the direct and circumstantial types. His model represents 
                                                 
3 Pollock (1995, p. 40) calls a “rebutting defeater” a reason for denying the conclusion of an argument 
where the premises offer a prima facie (defeasible) reason for the conclusion.  
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some of the critical questions as undercutters of a scheme and others as defeaters. Critical 
questions that function as undercutters or rebutters of an argumentation scheme are 
modeled in DefLog using three propositional operators.  The arrow ~> , called the 
defeasible conditional (Verheij, 2003, p. 184) is a form of implication that conforms to 
only one logical rule of inference, modus ponens.  The x is the unary operator for 
dialectical negation, used to express the claim that a sentence is defeated (Verheij, 2003, 
p. 184). We have to be careful to observe that if a proposition’s dialectical negation is 
justified, that shows the argument is defeated, but the converse does not obtain. If a 
proposition is justified, that does not necessarily show that its dialectical negation is 
defeated (Verheij, 2003a, p. 327).4 The & (ampersand) is the operator for conjunction.  
     An undercutter is directed to attacking the inferential link between the premises and 
the conclusion in the original argument. In its logical form, the dialectical negation 
applies to the whole defeasible conditional of the argument attacked. 
 
x (premise 1, premise 2, . . . , premise n ~> conclusion) 
 
Arguments attacking the conclusion of the original argument, are modeled (below) as 
defeaters. Here the dialectical negation applies only to the consequent. 
 
premise 1, premise 2, . . . , premise n ~> x conclusion 
 
Undercutters have a different kind of underlying logic than defeaters in Verheij’s system. 
This distinction will come to be important when we come to see how Verheij approaches 
the problem of modeling the critical questions matching the two ad hominem 
argumentation schemes, the problem to be taken up in the next section. 
     A new computational system of reasoning of with argumentation schemes called 
Carneades provides a model that enables argumentation schemes to be integrated into the 
semantic web. It defines structures for integrating basic elements of argumentation, 
including atomic propositions, arguments, cases, issues, argumentation schemes and 
proof standards. In one respect, Carneades is an extension of Verheij’s proposed system 
for formalization of argumentation schemes, because it portrays every scheme as based 
on a set of premises, one of which is a generalization that can be expressed in the form of 
a defeasible conditional statement. Thus, like Verheij’s system, it casts the various 
presumptive schemes of the kind commonly analyzed in (Walton, 1995) as having the 
DMP form. A useful feature of Carneades for formalizing argumentation schemes is that 
it provides a way of formalizing the critical questions as components of any given 
defeasible argumentation scheme.5 
     Carneades is not a formalization of argument in the manner of a deductive formal 
system of logic. It is a computational model that builds on ontologies from the semantic 
web to provide a platform for employing argumentation schemes in legal reasoning. In 
effect, the model is an abstract functional specification of a computer program that can be 
                                                 
4  According to Verheij (2003a, p. 327), neither of the double negation rules of classical logic holds for 
dialectical negation  
5 Note however that Verheij’s format for argumentation schemes has four kinds of elements: premises, 
exceptions, conditions of use and conclusions. Each of these elements corresponds to a different kind of 
critical question. 
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implemented in any programming language. Arguments modeled in the Carneades 
system can be visualized using an argument diagram because the basic structure 
Carneades uses, following the model of the semantic web, is that of the directed labeled 
graph. The nodes represent objects and the arrows represent binary relations.6 It is 
especially important for our purpose to look carefully at how Carneades models the 
notion of argument defeat. What are called defeaters or rebuttals in Pollock’s language 
are modeled as arguments that are opposed to another argument at issue. For example if 
one argument at issue is pro, its rebuttal would be another argument con that argument. 
Premise defeat is modeled by an argument con an antecedent or assumption, or pro an 
exception (Gordon, 2005, p. 56). In Carneades, a Pollock-style undercutter of an 
argument n is modeled as an argument against the implicit applicability presumption of a 
scheme, i.e. an argument con the atom (applies arg-n true). 
     The Carneades system defines three kinds of defeat relations or argument rebuttals. 
The first type consists of arguments con the consequent of a pro argument. The second 
type consists of arguments pro the consequent of a con argument. The third type consists 
of arguments pro alternative positions on the same issue. Undercutters correspond to 
arguments con applicability presumptions. An example is the assumption that the 
generalization ‘Birds fly’ is applicable to Tweety.  
     An output representing an argument in Carneades can be visualized using an 
Araucaria argument diagram. The basic units of the system, called atoms, as in the 
example, (asserts Gloria (killed joe sam)), are made up of subjects, objects and 
binary predicates. Atoms are defined as RDF triples of the following kind (Gordon, 2005, 
54).  
 
 type atom = 
{ predicate: symbol’ 
 subject: symbol, 
 object: datum } 
 
Argumentation is viewed as a model construction process that tracks issues about which 
atoms should be included in a domain model. An issue is defined as a record for keeping 
track of the arguments pro and con each position (Gordon, 2005, p. 55). A position, 
which can be accepted, rejected or undecided, is a proposed or claimed value of an atom. 
An argument is defined as a single atom called a consequent and another set of atoms 
called premises. The distinctive feature of how Carneades models arguments is that is 
recognizes three different types of premises called antecedents, assumptions and 
exceptions. Antecedents are normal premises that are assumed to be acceptable, and must 
be justifiable to make an argument acceptable. Assumptions are assumed to be acceptable 
unless called into question. Exceptions are premises that are not assumed to be 
acceptable, but are taken for granted for the sake of argument unless they are challenged. 
This distinction can be clarified by comparing the three kinds of premises to critical 
questions matching an argumentation scheme. They can be classified into three 
categories, depending on whether they are treated as antecedents, presumptions or 
exceptions. Antecedents are like premises that are already present as required premises in 
                                                 
6 The resource description framework (RDF) of the semantic web provides an XML syntax representing a 
graph. 
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a scheme, and so critical questions questioning them can be seen as redundant. 
Assumptions are premises that are assumed to be true, while exceptions are premises that 
assumed to be false, even though they may later be shown to be true. 
     It is important to note that an exception is different from the negation of a 
presumption. An assumption is an additional premise of the generalization (conditional) 
that represents the structure of the argument. Consider the conditional in the Tweety 
example, shown as an argument in Carneades. 
 
(if and (isa tweety bird) (applies arg-1 true)) (canfly tweety true)) 
 
If we tried to model an exception as the negation of presumption, we get the conditional: 
 
if (and (isa tweety bird) (not (isa tweety penguin)) (applies arg-1 
true)) (canfly tweety true)) 
 
The proper way to model an exception is by a conditional of this form: 
 
if (and (isa tweety penguin) (applies arg-1 true))bottom) 
 
An exception, as modeled in Carneades, expresses a constraint on an argument. It cannot 
be treated in the same way as an application of an argument. 
     Each argument is provided with an identifier called an id. The following definition 
(Gordon, 2005, p. 56) shows how all the various elements are combined in the definition 
of the data type for an argument. Arguments are provided with an identifier allowing 
propositions to be about arguments, because the identifier of an argument can be used as 
the subject or object of an atom. Using this feature, an applicability presumption of the 
form (applies <argument-id> true) is added to every argument. 
 
type argument = 
{ id: id, 
direction: {pro, con},  
consequent: atom,  
antecedent: atom list,  
assumptions: atom list,  
exceptions: atom list} 
 
As noted above, premise defeat is modeled by an argument con an antecedent or 
assumption, or pro an exception (Gordon, 2005, p. 56). Also as noted above, Carneades 
follows Verheij’s lead in modeling the most familiar sorts of argumentation schemes as 
having the DMP form.  
     There are many interpretations of the Tweety argument, but let’s consider one  
that allows for different ways for Tweety to be abnormal, and to be an exception to the 
generalization that birds normally fly. The term ‘abnormal’ should be taken to mean 
abnormal because of being a nonflying bird, and not abnormal in some other way. This 
version of the Tweety argument can be visualized in Carneades as shown in figure 8. 
Assumptions are shown as statements leading to a conclusion by a closed dot arrowhead, 
while exceptions are shown with an open dot arrowhead. 
 
Figure 8: Diagram of the Stage 1 of the Tweety Argument 
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In the diagram in figure 8, the statement ‘Tweety is abnormal’ could still be supported 
with further argument, but is not, and thus it does not make the argument default. Both 
premises ‘Tweety is a bird’ and ‘Birds normally fly’ are assumptions in this argument, 
each shown to lead to the conclusion by a closed dot arrowhead. Thus they support the 
argument a1, leading to the conclusion that Tweety can fly. The statement ‘Tweety is an 
abnormal bird’ is shown as an exception (indicated by the open dot arrowhead). It is 
assumed to be false, unless further evidence indicates that it applies. The argument a1 is 
shown in a darkened node, indicating that it is acceptable, and thus the conclusion drawn 
from it is also shown as acceptable.  
     So far, we have seen only the first stage of the Tweety argument, where there is no 
evidence so far indicating that Tweety is other than a normal bird. If we add new 
evidence that would support the statement that Tweey is an abnormal bird, it would 
defeat the previous argument shown in figure 8. This development is shown in figure 9, 
introducing the additional statement that Tweety is a penguin. 
 
Figure 9: Stage 2 of the Tweety Argument  
 
      
23 
 
In figure 9, the statement ‘Tweety is a penguin’ is darkened, showing that it is accepted. 
Thus argument a2 is acceptable, leading to the accepted conclusion that Tweety is an 
abnormal bird. Adding this evidence shows that a1 is not longer acceptable, and that the 
conclusion ‘Tweety can fly’ must now be rejected. Thus the original argument shown in 
figure 8 has defaulted, because new evidence shows that it is no longer acceptable. 
 
7. Formally Modeling the Critical Questions 
 
     The general problem is how to represent the critical questions as ways of challenging 
or refuting arguments that fit one of these forms of argument. Verheij suggested that it 
may be useful to treat some of the questions in a different way from others. Critical 
questions that point to exceptions to a general rule only undercut an argument, while 
others could be seen refuting the argument by denying implicit assumptions on which it 
rests, or by pointing to counter-arguments. He began by showing that critical questions 
can have four different kinds of roles.  
1. They can be used to question whether a premise of a scheme holds.  
2. They can point to exceptional situations in which a scheme should not be used. 
3. They can set conditions for the proper use of a scheme. 
4. They can point to other arguments that might be used to attack the scheme. 
Verheij argued that critical questions that criticize the premises of a scheme are 
redundant because they merely ask whether the premise is true. It is a condition of the use 
of any argument that the premises are true, or at least are acceptable. Thus he argued that 
critical questions that merely restate a premise of an argumentation scheme are 
redundant, and can be ignored. For example, the field question, in the list of critical 
questions matching argument from expert opinion above, could be said to be redundant, 
because the major premise already says that E is an expert in field F containing 
proposition A.  
     We now come to the difficult problem of modeling the critical questions by attempting 
to integrate them as components of the argumentation scheme for the argumentum ad 
hominem. Verheij (2003, p. 82) begins by citing the first critical question matching the 
direct ad hominem argument. It asks whether the premise is true, or well supported, that 
the arguer is a bad person. He notes (p. 182) that it is a precondition of the use of any 
scheme that its premises are true or well supported. He concludes that critical questions 
of this kind are already implicitly given in the argumentation scheme itself, and that 
therefore it is not necessary to have them as separate critical questions. From a formal 
viewpoint, this analysis is reasonable. Such critical questions are very useful for practical 
purposes of teaching students in an argumentation course to think more critically by 
looking at standard ways and argument should be questioned. However when it comes to 
the project of formalizing argumentation schemes, it is not necessary to have specific 
questions merely asking whether a premise is true. The reason is that we can 
automatically assume that a critic can question whether any premise of the scheme is 
true. 
     Critical questions of the third kind, that set conditions on the applicability of the 
scheme, are modeled in DefLog using a different kind of rule. In this rule, C represents a 
condition on the applicability of a scheme. 
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(premise 1, premise 2, . . . , premise n ~> conclusion) only if C 
 
According to this rule, if condition C does not apply, the scheme is undercut. As an 
examples of this kind of critical question Verheij (2003, p. 183) cites the critical question 
matching the ad hominem type of argument that asks whether character is relevant. Thus 
it would seem that critical questions asking about relevance would come under this 
classification. Relevance represents a fourth way of attacking an argument, apart from the 
usual three ways commonly recognized – rebutting, undercutting and attacking a premise.  
     When Verheij (2003, p. 183) examines the second critical question, which asks 
whether the allegation that the arguer is a bad person is relevant to judging his argument, 
he suggests that this type of critical question has a role that corresponds to what he calls 
“conditions for a schemes use”. This means that if the allegation that the arguer is a bad 
person is irrelevant to judging his argument, a kind of problem that often occurs, we can 
say that the argument used in a given case does not meet the required conditions for the 
correct use of a scheme. In other words, the criticism here is that the scheme has been 
misapplied by attempting to use it in a context where it should not properly be used. A 
problem with this approach is that much the same thing could be said about the 
redundancy of the critical question that was said about the first critical question matching 
the direct ad hominem argumentation scheme. With respect to any given argument 
matching any one of the schemes, the question can always be asked, and perhaps should 
always be asked, of whether the argument is relevant. Thus it would seem that neither of 
the critical questions is necessary in the case of the direct ad hominem type of argument. 
Both are redundant, when it comes to formalization, because both are routine questions 
that would apply to any scheme. 
     The practical problem remains however that when giving students advice on how to 
analyze and evaluate an ad hominem argument in a given case, there are two criticisms 
that are especially important and fundamental. Many direct ad hominem arguments are 
based on innuendo, where very little evidence is brought forward to support the allegation 
that the arguer has bad character. It is most important to warn students about this, because 
the ad hominem argument is such a powerful attack that it can often unseat an opponent 
or critic who fails to think twice that the evidence lacking to back up the allegation is one 
source of questioning or attacking the argument.  
     DefLog provides a formal model of argumentation that allows us to represent critical 
questions as different kinds of undercutting or defeating counter-arguments that can be 
used to attack an argument fitting one of the ad hominem schemes. Thus it, for the first 
time, provides a method that can be used not only to identify and analyze ad hominem 
arguments, but also to evaluate them. This step forward is a big one. Carneades goes even 
further by showing how the critical questions can be incorporated into the scheme itself. 
     Carneades is a computational system that builds on technologies from the semantic 
web and provides a platform for using argumentation schemes for argument analysis and 
evaluation (Gordon and Walton, 2006). An argument is defined as a triple, made up of a 
statement designated as the conclusion, a direction, pro or con, and a set of premises 
(statements). Arguments in Carneades are visualized with argument diagrams that are 
compatible with the semantic web, using an XML syntax. The Carneades diagram 
visualizes an argument as a directed graph in which the nodes are statements or 
25 
arguments, and the lines joining the nodes represent inferences from a set of premises to a 
conclusion, or from an argument to a conclusion. An argument is identified by 
recognizing its scheme (id), and its direction, pro or con the statement at issue. 
Arguments are judged as acceptable or not in relation to an issue being discussed. An 
issue functions as a record for keeping track of the arguments pro and con each position 
as the argument progresses through the dialogue (Gordon and Walton, 2006). A statement 
can be accepted, rejected or at issue. Whether a premise holds in any given argument 
depends on its dialectical status and the type of premises it contains. 
     The key motivation of the Carneades system is its capability for dealing with two 
kinds of critical question (Walton and Gordon, 2005). Carneades recognizes three types 
of premises, called ordinary premises7, assumptions and exceptions (Gordon and Walton, 
2006). Assumptions are assumed to be acceptable unless called into question. Ordinary 
premises are automatically classified as presumptions. Both of these kinds of premises 
are taken to hold unless they are at issue. Exceptions, on the other hand, are taken not to 
hold. An exception can block or undercut the acceptability of an argument as a dialogue 
proceeds if evidence comes in supporting the statement classified as an exception in the 
argument. It does this by revealing assumptions and exceptions as implicit premises in a 
given argument as the argument is critically questioned or attacked.  
     Carneades models the argumentation scheme for the direct ad hominem argument by 
including the factors corresponding to the critical questions as premises of the scheme. It 
accomplishes this task by distinguishing between two kinds of premises called 
assumptions and exceptions. The scheme for the direct type of ad hominem argument is 
formalized as follows.  
 
Formalization of the Direct Ad Hominem Scheme in Carneades 
 
id: arg-i 
direction: con, 
scheme: direct-ad-hominem-argument,  
conclusion: (a’s argument should not be accepted),  
ordinary premises: 
(a isa person of bad character), 
presumptions: 
(assertion (a isa person of bad character (based-on-evidence)) 
(character is at issue), 
exceptions: 
  (a’s argument should be accepted true)absolutely rejected) 
   
The argumentation scheme for the circumstantial ad hominem argument can be 
formalized in the Carneades system as follows. 
 
Formalization of the Circumstantial Ad Hominem Scheme in Carneades 
 
id: arg-i 
direction: con, 
scheme:circumstantial-ad-hominem argument,  
conclusion: (a’s-argument-plausible-true),  
ordinary premises: 
(personal-circumstances a show a con a’s argument), 
assumptions: 
                                                 
7 Ordinary premises are the premises explicitly stated in a scheme. Assumptions and exceptions correspond 
to critical questions matching a scheme. 
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(pair-of-commitments shown to be practically inconsistent) 
(based-on-evidence e true)  
(character is at-issue), 
exceptions:  
(practical inconsistency can be resolved by further dialogue) 
  ((a’s argument should be accepted true)absolutely rejected) 
 
Carneades offers a formalization of these schemes that removes the need to deal with the 
critical questions in a purely dialogue format, by incorporating them into the premises of 
the scheme. Using this method of formalization of argumentation schemes, all of the 
schemes for the various types of ad hominem arguments analyzed in (Walton, 1998) 
could be formalized in the same manner. This work can be suggested as a project for 
further research on the ad hominem argument.  
 
8. Evaluation of the Ad Hominem Argument in the Sealers Example 
 
     Now we come back to the original question: how could the circumstantial ad hominem 
argument identified in the sealers example the evaluated? First, we have to comment on 
how the critical questions were analyzed. What was suggested by the remarks in sections 
6 and 7 is the importance of carefully distinguishing between the project of formalizing 
the critical questions matching an argumentation scheme and the project of teaching 
critical argumentation skills by formulating common failings of a type of argument that a 
critic needs to be aware of. Critical questions in this more practical sense function as 
pointers to gaps in the logical structure of an argument that a critic needs to be aware of 
as requiring justification. 
     Now let’s turn to the four critical questions cited as appropriate for the circumstantial 
type of ad hominem argument. The first question is important because the pair of 
commitments said to be inconsistent need to be identified. The first step, in order to 
evaluate the charge of inconsistency, is to identify the pair of propositions that are 
supposed to be inconsistent. In many cases one or both of these propositions are implicit 
premises of a chain of argumentation in the discourse. In such cases much of the 
argument analysis that is required prior to evaluating the argument is the task of digging 
out this pair of propositions in such a way that both can be explicitly stated in a way that 
is fair to the text of discourse. Unfortunately however, from a theoretical point of view, 
this question has been formulated as a yes-no question, merely asking the critic whether 
such a pair of propositions can be said to exist, yes or no. Although this form of question 
works well enough as a practical tool to aid critical argumentation, in order to formalize 
this argumentation scheme it might be better to ask the critic to specifically identify the 
pair of propositions. 
     The second critical question asks whether the inconsistency that has now been 
identified could be resolved or explained by further dialogue. The third critical question 
in effect asks the question of relevance, by asking whether the arguer’s original argument 
should depend on his or her credibility. If credibility is an issue then an ad hominem 
argument is relevant whereas otherwise it tends not to be. Therefore this critical question 
comes very close to asking whether the ad hominem argument is relevant in the given 
case. The fourth critical question concerns the conclusion of the ad hominem argument 
attacking the original argument. Essentially, this question asks whether the ad hominem 
argument should be interpreted as a defeater or as an undercutter of the original 
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argument. This question is of practical importance because in many instances, an ad 
hominem argument can be a legitimate way of asking questions about the arguer’s 
credibility, but it is such a powerful form of argument that in many cases it is taken to 
resoundingly defeat the original argument. It is this observation that is the basis of the ad 
hominem fallacy (Walton, 1998). Such an interpretation suggests that the argument 
cannot be rehabilitated, and that the original argument has been so strongly refuted that 
no further attempts to defend it could ever possibly succeed. In other words, this 
interpretation of how to evaluate such an argument is one that suggests that the 
investigation should be closed off. The problem is that in many cases such a strong 
interpretation of the argument is inappropriate. 
     Now let us return to the sealers example, and discuss the problem of how to evaluate 
the circumstantial ad hominem identified in it as reasonable or fallacious. S has a good 
argument, assuming the premises of the circumstantial ad hominem argument against C 
are justified as supported by the evidence in the case. How good is C’s reply? C’s reply 
could perhaps be justified by claiming it fits critical question 2 or critical question 3. 
Let’s consider them one at a time. It could be argued that even though the practical 
inconsistency has been identified, and a plausible case for it has been made, it could be 
resolved or explained by further dialogue showing that C’s inconsistent commitment does 
not support the claim that he lacks credibility. It might be argued that the “brutal 
destruction” of the seals is so inhumane that stopping it is the most important thing, and 
that being consistent does not matter, compared to that. The argument is that C has 
credibility, because his worthy ethical motive is to save the seals. 
    Similarly it might be argued, by citing critical question 3, that character is not the issue 
in the dialogue, and that C’s argument does not depend on his credibility. The reason 
offered is that the “brutal destruction” of the seals is so inhumane that stopping it is the 
most important thing, and that one person’s character does not matter, compared to that.  
Both attempted rebuttals are based on relevance, the argument essentially being that 
saving the seals is so important that it is the only issue to be considered, and that matters 
of consistency and character are irrelevant. S puts forward this argument saying that the 
foie gras issue is not relevant, because the issue is about seals. One way in which an ad 
hominem argument is typically fallacious concerns its relevance (Walton, 1998). Ad 
hominem arguments can often be relevant for example in political discourse and election 
campaigns, or in questioning the character of a witness in a trial. But there are also plenty 
of cases where they are not relevant, but they’re simply used to distract an audience by 
bringing up colorful and interesting allegations of character, or bad ethical practices, that 
can quickly and effectively prejudice an audience against an arguer. 
     In some cases where a pragmatic inconsistency is alleged in an ad hominem argument, 
it is possible to resolve the conflict by a further dialogue. In some cases, for example, the 
person accused can explain the contradiction by showing it does not really show that he 
or she is being hypocritical or insincere, as in the smoking example. In other cases 
however, there is a sharp contradiction between what an arguer claims and what she 
strongly professes to be her own basic principles, in previous actions, or in a previous 
argument that she has put forward. In the sealers case the chef has argued against 
inhumane treatment of animals, but his actions suggest otherwise. In the sealers case, 
such a resolution of the conflict does not seem to be possible, because the circumstances 
are strongly opposed, and neither side is willing to make concessions. However, one 
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possible way of continuing the dialogue would be for C to claim that he uses only 
“decent” foie gras, that does not conform to the French legal definition of foie gras, and 
does not have the same quality.  
     It has been shown that the evaluation of the ad hominem in the sealers example 
depends most centrally on the factors specified in the antecedent, assumption and 
exceptions of the scheme for the circumstantial ad hominem presented above. The 
antecedent is the statement that C’s personal circumstances are inconsistent with the 
argument that C put forward. Whether or not this statement is justified by the evidence in 
the example is something that cannot be proved or disproved using the scheme only. As 
we saw, this example is comparable to the hunters example, where the claim of 
inconsistency depends on how the involvement of C is described. Still, the antecedent 
cites the key statement assumed to be true in the ad hominem argument put forward by S. 
The first assumption is that the pair of commitments in the example can be shown to be 
practically inconsistent. The second assumption is the inconsistency that is taken to show 
that C is a person of bad character, in this instance, a hypocrite. It shows that the parties 
putting forward the argument against S are not sincere in following their own policies 
they advocate for others. The third assumption is that character is at issue. This 
presumption is the statement that character is a relevant issue in the case, and it is around 
this assumption that much of the discussion of the evaluation of the argument outlined 
above has to be based on. 
     The evaluation of the sealers argumentation is shown in figure 10, where the premises 
and conclusion of the argument are represented as nodes containing statements, and an 
argument is a node represented as a circle containing the identifier of the argument and 
its argumentation scheme.  
 
Figure 10: Evaluation of the Sealers Argument in Carneades 
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In figure 10, argument a1 is the sealers argument and its argumentation scheme is that for 
the circumstantial ad hominem. Directly under a1, three premises are represented. The 
first one, the statement that C has bad character, is an ordinary premise. The second one, 
the statement that C’s character is at issue, is an assumption. The third one, the statement 
that the inconsistency can be resolved, is an exception. Recall that exceptions have to be 
proved in order to defeat an argument. In other words, the respondent has to show that the 
inconsistency can be resolved by further dialogue, or otherwise the proponent’s argument 
stands. On the other hand, assumptions function like ordinary premises. They have to be 
proved, or supported by sufficient evidence, in order for the argument to hold. Such 
supporting evidence is presented in figure 10 under the first two premises. The ordinary 
premise that C has bad character is supported by the statement that C is a hypocrite, 
which is in turn supported by the evidence in the case that sees commitments are 
inconsistent. The assumption that C’s character is at issue is supported by the statement 
that the issue is about ethics. Normally in Carneades, what is at issue is defined at a 
different level (an earlier stage of the dialogue), but to simplify the representation of this 
case, we will insert the evidence in the case that the issue is about ethics as a statement.   
     Note that all the nodes in figure 10 are darkened except for the one on the right 
containing the statement that the inconsistency can be resolved by further dialogue. This 
premise of a1 is an exception. In the sealers case it was not proved by any further 
dialogue that ensued in the case. But as we look over the details of the sealers case and 
the analyses of the above, it is clearly justified to claim that the issue is about ethics, and 
that C’s commitments have been shown to be inconsistent. To evaluate the argument, we 
have to start from the bottom left. That C’s commitments were shown to be inconsistent 
shows that C is a hypocrite, which in turn shows that C has bad character. This premise, 
along with the premise that C’s character is at issue, and the failure of the exception (that 
the inconsistency can be resolved by further dialogue), shows that argument a1 is 
acceptable. Since argument a1is a circumstantial ad hominem argument against C’s prior 
argument, the argumentation as a whole, as displayed in figure ten, shows that C’s 
argument is not plausible. That statement is displayed at the top of figure 10 representing 
the conclusion of argument a1. 
     The Carneades diagram in figure 10 thus represents the analysis that the premises of 
the circumstantial ad hominem argument against C are justified, as supported by the 
evidence in the case. It is assumed that the practical inconsistency has been identified, 
that it shows that C is a hypocrite (at least defeasibly), and that the issue is about ethics.  
All of these assumptions are justified by the data presented in the original sealers case, or 
so it has been argued by the analysis of that case presented above in arguments alpha and 
beta. There is no evidence that C has resolved or explained the practical inconsistency.8  
The issue is about ethics, and therefore sees character is an issue. It follows that C’s 
character does matter, and that the attempted counterargument that a person’s character 
does not matter is defeated. To sum up, what has been shown is that the circumstantial 
argument against C shifts the burden of proof back on to C to show that has original 
                                                 
8 This evaluation of the dialogue shown in the text of the example does not imply that the dialogue could 
not be continued by expanding the example. For example, it might be found that C believes that foie gras is 
not really very bad, for some reason, or that the badness is outweighed by its gastronomical excellence. 
This extension of the dialogue could bring in value-based practical reasoning, re-opening the dialogue. 
30 
argument is plausible, by asking critical questions that are appropriate for the 
argumentation scheme for the circumstantial ad hominem argument. Thus it can be said 
that the circumstantial ad hominem argument in the sealers example is a reasonable one. 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
     As also shown by the analysis and evaluation in section 8, the two exceptions in the 
scheme are the key issues in the evaluation of the ad hominem in the case. These are the 
two exceptions to the effect that (1) the practical inconsistency can be resolved by further 
dialogue, and (2) the argument for C is being absolutely rejected by S. These statements 
are assumed to be false, but if evidence in the example shows that either is true, the 
generalization in the scheme would default, meaning that the circumstantial ad hominem 
argument against C would be evaluated as not acceptable. As shown in the Carneades 
evaluation of the argument in figure 10, the three worrisome premises are the statement 
that C has bad character, the statement that C’s character is at issue, and the statement 
that the inconsistency can be resolved. As shown in figure 10, the first two can be proved 
by supportive evidence, while the third is an exception that does not need to be proved, in 
order for the argument to be accepted. This analysis shows that the circumstantial ad 
hominem argument against C is justified. It is concluded that the text of discourse in the 
sealers case provides sufficient evidence to show that the circumstantial ad hominem 
argument in the case is a reasonable one, when all the evidence is fairly evaluated. 
      In this paper we began by showing that there are many different kinds of arguments 
used in the sealers case, and that as with any attempt to interpret a natural language text 
of discourse, the argumentation may need to be diagrammed in several different ways.  
We showed that it needs to be recognized that several argumentation schemes are 
centrally or tangentially involved. The process of carrying out an analysis of an argument 
must begin by making several kinds of careful judgments about how to interpret the 
argumentation in the given case (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004). New material 
will have to be added, by assumption, because many of the arguments will depend on 
implicit premises. Some of the given material will have to be deleted as unimportant. But 
such a judgment of importance depends on the purpose of the analysis, and what is hoped 
to be achieved. In this case the main purpose of our analysis was to illustrate an 
interesting example of the circumstantial ad hominem argument, and use that to pose 
various theoretical problems about how to formalize the argumentation scheme for this 
type of argument. As shown by comparing the sealers example to other previously 
studied examples, namely the smoking example and the hunter example, it was shown 
how subtleties are involved in attempting to analyze and evaluate this kind of 
argumentation. It is not for nothing that this type of argument has traditionally been 
classified as an informal fallacy (Walton, 1998). We have shown that it well deserves its 
reputation as a tricky and deceptive tactic with many subtle features that need to be 
carefully analyzed. 
     It is concluded that the foregoing effort to identify and analyze the argument in the 
sealers case has been successful. This task was carried out by identifying the 
argumentation scheme for the circumstantial ad hominem type of argument, and showing 
how that scheme is applicable to the data given in the text of discourse for the sealers 
example. It was shown how the scheme applied to the case, first of all by identifying 
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argument alpha and argument beta in section 3, and then by showing how the one party 
used the circumstantial ad hominem argument identified in the sealers example to attack 
argument beta. It was then shown how this particular instance of the circumstantial ad 
hominem argument can be represented by identifying its premises and conclusion in the 
argument diagramming system Araucaria. It was shown how each of the premises in the 
scheme was there to be found in the argument against argument alpha. Each premise is 
essential to the scheme and to identifying its existence in a given case. The argument 
premise is essential because it is sometimes overlooked that an ad hominem argument is 
not merely a character attack or a personal smear against a person, but is the use of this 
specific kind of attack to attack another party’s argument. The inconsistent commitment 
premise is essential because the defining characteristic of the circumstantial type of ad 
hominem argument, as opposed to the direct type or other types, is the presence of an 
alleged inconsistency. Essentially, the critic argues that the original arguer does not 
practice what he preaches, implying that his personal actions and circumstances express 
commitments that are inconsistent with his argument. The credibility questioning premise 
is essential in order for the argument to be a genuine ad hominem argument, as noted 
above. We showed how all the premises and the conclusion can be identified in the 
sealers case. We made no comment on how well each of them is justified by the evidence 
given in the case, but noted that C did not dispute them 
     Next we looked at how this scheme could be formalized, first examining the system of 
Verheij. Then we examined some problems of modeling generalizations on which 
defeasible reasoning is based. We saw that a revised argumentation scheme for the 
circumstantial ad hominem argument can be developed by showing, following Verheij 
(2003), that this form of argument has a DMP structure. On Verheij’s formal analysis, an 
ad hominem scheme is based on a rule or generalization that is subject to exceptions. 
We then confronted the problem of modeling the critical questions, we moved on to the 
computational system for reasoning with argumentation schemes called Carneades. We 
showed how Carneades could also be used to solve the evaluation problem for the 
circumstantial ad hominem argument by modeling the critical questions as components of 
the scheme itself. Finally, we showed how this scheme can be used to structure the 
evaluation of the argument in the sealers example by specifying all the elements that need 
to be proved to make the argument acceptable in the case.  
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